All of my papers are available to download in pdf. Papers listed in order of publication, most recent first.
Habituation and First-Person Authority. <pdf 202kb>
Time and the Philosophy of Action, ed. Roman Altshuler and Michael Sigrist. Routledge, 2017.
Richard Moran’s deliberative account of self-knowledge is incompatible with empirical psychology of desire and at least one form of implicit bias.
Knowing One's Own Desires. <pdf 173kb>
Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology, ed. Daniel Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou, and Walter Hopp. Routledge, 2016.
Richard Moran's model of self-knowledge does not allow first-person authority over one's desires; Sartre’s conception of pure reflection does.
Instilling Virtue. <pdf 189kb>
From Personality to Virtue: Essays in the Philosophy of Character, ed. Alberto Masala and Jonathan Webber. OUP, 2016.
A range of experimental evidence supports the view that habituation of ethical virtues counters situational effects and implicit biases.
Character, Attitude and Disposition. <pdf 198kb>
European Journal of Philosophy 23: 1082-1096 (2015; published online 2013).
Empirical research into the nature of attitudes supports the psychological presuppositions of virtue ethics.
Automaticity in Virtuous Action. With Clea Rees. <pdf 194kb>
The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness, ed. Nancy Snow and Franco Trivigno. Routledge, 2014.
The automaticity in virtuous action is one of motivation, not of skill. It is modelled by attitude psychology and goal psychology.
Constancy, Fidelity, and Integrity. With Clea Rees. <pdf 158kb>
The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, ed. Stan van Hooft (Acumen, 2014).
Integrity consists in constancy of commitment, fidelity to commitments, fidelity to getting it right, and concern with the balance of these attitudes.
Intentional Side-Effects of Action. With Robin Scaife. <pdf 311kb>
Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2013): 179-203.
Experimental philosophy has not shown that the folk classification of side-effects as intentional is partly normative.
Cultivating Virtue. <pdf 217kb>
Phenomenology and Naturalism, ed. Havi Carel and Darian Meacham (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
Cultivating one's own virtue requires phenomenological reflection on the practical structure of lived experience.
Authenticity. <pdf 172kb>
Sartre: Key Concepts, ed. Steven Churchill and Jack Reynolds (Acumen, 2013).
Sartre vs Larmore on the nature and value of authenticity.
Bad Faith and the Unconscious. <pdf 176kb>
The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFolette (Wiley, 2013).
Freud vs Sartre on the nature of self-deception.
Review: The Boxer and the Goalkeeper: Sartre versus Camus, by Andy Martin. <pdf 76kb>
Times Literary Supplement 5724: 26. 14 December 2012.
A Law Unto Oneself. <pdf 243kb>
The Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2012): 170-189.
Kant's claim that one legislates maxims of action that bind oneself should be understood in terms of precedent, not statute.
Climate Change and Public Moral Reasoning. <pdf 217kb>
New Waves in Ethics, ed. Thom Brooks (Macmillan, 2011).
How moral psychology can save the world.
Virtue and Vice in the Hurt Locker. <pdf 111kb>
Dialogue 37 (November 2011).
How an Oscar winning film advances important ideas about the relation between virtue and vice.
Freedom. <pdf 172kb>
The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, ed. Sebastian Luft and Søren Overgaard (Routledge, 2011).
Sartre vs Merleau-Ponty on the freedom revealed by phenomenology.
There Is Something About Inez. <pdf 184kb>
Think 27 (2011).
What did Sartre mean by that famous phrase, 'Hell is other people'? And who is Inez anyway?
Bad Faith and the Other. <pdf 221kb>
Reading Sartre: on Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Jonathan Webber (Routledge: 2011).
We should read Sartre as diagnosing a social malady, rather than individual failing, of bad faith.
Character. <pdf 78kb>
The Philosophers' Magazine 50 (2010).
Brief introduction to the recent philosophical debate about character. Part of TPM's 'Ideas of the Century' series.
Existentialism. <pdf 213kb>
The Routledge Companion to Ethics, ed. John Skorupski (Routledge, 2010).
How to make sense of the bewildering variety of ways in which this word is used.
Reconstructing Alfie. <pdf 102kb>
The Philosophers' Magazine 47 (2009).
What's it all about then, eh? That's what I keep asking myself.
Sex. <pdf 364kb>
Philosophy 84 (2009): 233-250.
The sexual domain is governed by all and only the same moral concerns as govern our lives in general.
Character, Global and Local. <pdf 144kb>
Utilitas 19 (2007): 430-434.
Accepting the proposed 'fragmentation' theory of character is unnecessary and undesirable.
Character, Common-Sense, and Expertise. <pdf 368kb>
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2007): 89-104.
The concept of character is not rooted in the purported 'fundamental attribution error'.
Character, Consistency, and Classification. <pdf 128kb>
Mind 115 (2006): 651-658.
Just what is at issue in the debate about the nature of character traits?
Virtue, Character and Situation. <pdf 276kb>
Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2006): 193-213.
Experimental evidence supports the traditional view of character traits as general dispositions manifested in behavioural inclinations.
Sartre's Theory of Character. <pdf 184kb>
European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2006): 94-116.
The central theme of Sartre's existentialist philosophy is the idea that character consists in projects.
Doing Without Representation: Coping with Dreyfus. <pdf 132kb>
Philosophical Explorations 5 (2002): 82-88.
Hubert Dreyfus has not shown that action need not involve representation, only that it need not involve conceptual representation.
Motivated Aversion: Bad Faith and Non-Thetic Awareness. <pdf 156kb>
Sartre Studies International 8 (2002): 45-57.
Given its role in his theory of bad faith, Sartre's term 'non-thetic' should be understood to mean 'non-conceptual'.