All of my papers are available to download in pdf. These are mostly penultimate drafts rather than the published versions.
Papers listed in order of publication, most recent first.
Sartre's Critique of Husserl
Prereflective Consciousness: Early Sartre in the Context of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind
ed. Sofia Miguens Travis, Clara Morando, and Gerhard Preyer. De Gruyter, forthcoming. <pdf, 229kb>
Reconstruction of Sartre's scattered comments on Husserl to form a coherent critique that motivates Sartre's distinctive philosophical methodology.
Analysis 73: 651-659 (2013). <open access>
We ought to consider lying to be worse than misleading, with bullshit assertion in between.
From Personality to Virtue: Essays in the Philosophy of Character, ed. Alberto Masala and Jonathan Webber. Forthcoming. <pdf 201kb>
A range of experimental evidence supports the view that habituation of ethical virtues counters situational effects and implicit biases.
Automaticity in Virtuous Action. With Clea Rees.
The Philosophy and Psychology of Character and Happiness, ed. Nancy Snow and Franco Trivigno. Routledge, 2014. <pdf 194kb>
The automaticity in virtuous action is one of motivation, not of skill. It is modelled by attitude psychology and goal psychology.
Constancy, Fidelity, and Integrity. With Clea Rees.
The Handbook of Virtue Ethics, ed. Stan van Hooft (Acumen, 2014). <pdf 158kb>
Integrity consists in constancy of commitment, fidelity to commitments, fidelity to getting it right, and concern with the balance of these attitudes.
Character, Attitude and Disposition.
European Journal of Philosophy forthcoming (online 2013). <pdf 198kb>
Empirical research into the nature of attitudes supports the psychological presuppositions of virtue ethics.
Intentional Side-Effects of Action. With Robin Scaife.
Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2013). <pdf 311kb>
Experimental philosophy has not shown that the folk classification of side-effects as intentional is partly normative.
Phenomenology and Naturalism, ed. Havi Carel and Darian Meacham (Cambridge University Press, 2013). <pdf 217kb>
Cultivating one's own virtue requires phenomenological reflection on the practical structure of lived experience.
Sartre: Key Concepts, ed. Steven Churchill and Jack Reynolds (Acumen, 2013). <pdf 172kb>
Sartre vs Larmore on the nature and value of authenticity.
Bad Faith and the Unconscious.
The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFolette (Wiley, 2013). <pdf 176kb>
Freud vs Sartre on the nature of self-deception.
A Law Unto Oneself.
The Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2012). <pdf 243kb>
Kant's claim that one legislates maxims of action that bind oneself should be understood in terms of precedent, not statute.
Climate Change and Public Moral Reasoning.
New Waves in Ethics, ed. Thom Brooks (Macmillan, 2011). <pdf 217kb>
How moral psychology can save the world.
Virtue and Vice in the Hurt Locker.
Dialogue 37 (November 2011). <pdf 111kb>
How an Oscar winning film advances important ideas about the relation between virtue and vice.
The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology, ed. Sebastian Luft and Søren Overgaard (Routledge, 2011). <pdf 172kb>
Sartre vs Merleau-Ponty on the freedom revealed by phenomenology.
Review: Reading Sartre, by Joseph S. Catalano.
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 9 February 2011. <pdf 135kb>
Homage to Catalano.
There Is Something About Inez.
Think 27 (2011). <pdf 184kb>
What did Sartre mean by that famous phrase, 'Hell is other people'? And who is Inez anyway?
Bad Faith and the Other.
Reading Sartre: on Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Jonathan Webber (Routledge: 2010). <pdf 221kb>
We should read Sartre as diagnosing a social malady, rather than individual failing, of bad faith.
The Philosophers' Magazine 50 (2010). <pdf 78kb>
Brief introduction to the recent philosophical debate about character. Part of TPM's 'Ideas of the Century' series.
The Routledge Companion to Ethics, ed. John Skorupski (Routledge, 2010). <pdf 213kb>
How to make sense of the bewildering variety of ways in which this word is used.
The Philosophers' Magazine 47 (2009). <pdf 102kb>
What's it all about then, eh? That's what I keep asking myself.
Philosophy 84 (2009). <pdf 364kb>
The sexual domain is governed by all and only the same moral concerns as govern our lives in general.
Character, Global and Local.
Utilitas 19 (2007). <pdf 144kb>
Accepting the proposed 'fragmentation' theory of character is unnecessary and undesirable.
Character, Common-Sense, and Expertise.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2007). <pdf 368kb>
The concept of character is not rooted in the purported 'fundamental attribution error'.
Character, Consistency, and Classification.
Mind 115 (2006). <pdf 128kb>
Just what is at issue in the debate about the nature of character traits?
Virtue, Character and Situation.
Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2006). <pdf 276kb>
Experimental evidence supports the traditional view of character traits as general dispositions manifested in behavioural inclinations.
Sartre's Theory of Character.
European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2006). <pdf 184kb>
The central theme of Sartre's existentialist philosophy is the idea that character consists in projects.
Doing Without Representation: Coping with Dreyfus.
Philosophical Explorations 5 (2002). <pdf 132kb>
Hubert Dreyfus has not shown that action need not involve representation, only that it need not involve conceptual representation.
Motivated Aversion: Bad Faith and Non-Thetic Awareness.
Sartre Studies International 8 (2002). <pdf 156kb>
Given its role in his theory of bad faith, Sartre's term 'non-thetic' should be understood to mean 'non-conceptual'.